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Multiparty Democracies and Rapid Economic Growth
A Twenty-first Century Breakthrough?
Devin Joshi
Abstract
This essay examines whether developing countries with competitive multiparty 
democracies may be just as capable of sustaining rapid economic growth 
as single-party states. It begins with a literature review identifying political 
stability and the ability to mobilize labor and capital production inputs as key 
factors behind sustained rapid growth. It then develops the hypothesis that under 
certain conditions, multiparty democracies may be strong in these dimensions, 
but ceteris paribus, single-party states are likely to have an advantage. I test 
this hypothesis by exploring historical trends in rapid growth over the last five 
decades. Statistical regression analysis confirms that most sustained high-
growth regimes have not been competitive multiparty democracies. On a more 
optimistic note, however, the number of high-growth multiparty democracies 
increased significantly during the period between 2000 and 2009, signaling a 
possible breakthrough in the twenty-first century.
Key words:  Democracy, multiparty democracy, single-party states, 
authoritarianism, political regimes, rapid growth, economic 
growth, sustained growth.
 
In recent years, a trend in Western political economy scholarship has been 
to argue that competitive multiparty democracies (CMDs) are either good 
for economic growth or that CMDs and non-CMD regimes on average have 
roughly the same record when it comes to economic growth.1 Hence, if both 
regime-types fare about the same, it makes sense for developing countries to 
choose a CMD political system to enjoy the benefits of both democracy and 
economic growth. If this inference is correct, opting for multiparty democracy 
Devin Joshi is Assistant Professor in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University 
of Denver. <devin.joshi@du.edu>
1 One of the most definitive studies in this literature is Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose 
Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions 
and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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will not threaten economic growth rates in the developing world; instead, it may 
actually improve prospects for growth.2 The historical experience of countries 
such as China, Taiwan, and Singapore in sustaining rapid growth under single-
party regimes, however, defies this logic. Not only is China growing quickly 
in the twenty-first century, but also quite possibly the absence of multiparty 
democracy has boosted its pace of economic development.
Addressing this puzzle, I investigate whether competitive multiparty 
democracies are just as capable as single-party states when it comes to 
sustaining rapid economic growth. This essay fills an important gap in the 
literature on political regime-types and economic growth. Although dozens 
of papers on this subject have appeared over the last decade, there has been 
relatively little careful analysis of the relationship between political regime-
type and sustained rapid economic growth, an area of particular concern for 
political leaders and populations in the developing world. Many nations in the 
“Third World” seek not only to expand their economies, but also to sustain rapid 
economic growth in order to catch up to wealthy industrialized countries.
The essay begins by discussing some of the major findings from the 
literature on the relationship between regime-type and economic growth. I then 
theorize why single-party political regimes, as experienced in Taiwan prior 
to its democratization, may have an advantage over competitive multiparty 
democracies in sustaining rapid growth. Third, I examine the historical record 
over the past half-century, one decade at a time, to see whether CMDs or 
non-CMD regimes have been more successful in sustaining high economic 
growth rates. Lastly, I try to make sense of the paradoxical empirical finding 
that although multiparty democracies generally failed to sustain rapid growth 
between 1960 and 1999, they were more successful in the period from 2000 
to 2009.
Literature Review
The puzzle of what causes economic growth is a broad topic that has generated 
much debate. Here, I focus on a narrow subset of the growth literature that 
links the presence of democratic or authoritarian regimes with differential 
rates of economic growth. Perhaps the most consistent finding of the literature 
has been the inability to detect a systematic positive or negative relationship 
between democratic regimes and economic growth. As a result, a large number 
of cross-national empirical studies have concluded that regime-type may have 
little if any systematic causal impact upon economic growth rates.3
2 Hristos Doucouliagos and Mehmet Ali Ulubasoglu, “Democracy and Economic Growth: A 
Meta-Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 1 (2008): 61-83.
3 These studies include Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, “Democracy and Economic Growth”; 
Adrian Leftwich, ed., Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1996); Przeworski et al, Democracy and Development; Adam Przeworski and Fernando 
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One area of contention in this debate has been over how to define and 
measure political regime-types. One approach taken by Adam Przeworski and 
his colleagues has been to define regime-type dichotomously as democratic 
or nondemocratic, based on whether a government holds periodic elections 
and experiences alternation of political parties in power.4 Using this approach, 
they found competitive multiparty democracies and non-CMD regimes to 
perform roughly the same on economic growth. Many studies using a more 
graded measure of democracy have come to similar conclusions. A recent 
meta-analysis of seventy-six of these studies found no direct effect between 
democracy and growth, although some indirect effects may give democracies 
an advantage.5
Aside from cross-national statistical studies, single-country and 
comparative case studies also have contributed to the debate. Many of 
these studies have focused on East Asia, the region experiencing the fastest 
economic growth overall in the post-1950 period. Case studies of authoritarian 
governments in Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have credited these 
states’ ability to centralize authority, coordinate economic activity, and 
promote export-oriented economic production through state control of banks, 
state-owned enterprises, and/or state-business cooperation.6 Stephan Haggard 
argued these authoritarian states’ ability to insulate technocratic decision-
makers gave them an advantage over economically less successful countries 
in Latin America, such as Mexico and Brazil.7 This theme was further 
developed by Peter Evans, who found the “embedded autonomy” of South 
Korean bureaucratic decision-makers to have given the country an advantage 
in fostering elite consensus in developing competitive industrial advantages 
compared to the more fragmented and contentious political environments in 
countries such as Brazil, India, and Senegal.8
Limongi. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 3 
(1993): 51-69; Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles, “The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth 
and Income Inequality: A Review,” Studies in Comparative International Development 25, no. 
1 (1991): 126-157; and Gizachew Tiruneh, “Regime Type and Economic Growth in Africa: A 
Cross-National Analysis,” Social Science Journal 46 (2006): 3-18.
4 Przeworski et al, Democracy and Development.
5 Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, “Democracy and Economic Growth.”
6 These case studies include Jon S.T. Quah, “Singapore's Model of Development: Is It Transferable?” 
in Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity, ed. Henry S. 
Rowen (New York: Routledge, 1998); Robert H. Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory 
and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990); and Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
7 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
8 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995).
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These comparative and individual case studies support the argument that 
sustained rapid growth is more likely to take place in a single-party state than 
in a competitive multiparty democracy. In fact, single-party states may have 
a comparative advantage when it comes to sustaining rapid growth due to 
leadership continuity. According to this logic:
The polities of the high-growth systems have shared certain 
features. All have stressed hierarchical authority; have had 
relatively inexplicit ideological commitments; maintained 
one-party dominant electoral systems; circumscribed political 
expression in many circumstances. All have maintained 
relatively open, export-oriented economies with substantial 
ties to Western markets and capital, and all shown concerted 
attention over an extended period to problems of mobilizing 
and distributing resources efficiently. What these states 
have had in common are periods of rule by innovative and 
powerful authorities who have shown relative success in 
launching vigorous economic growth and a broadly similar 
strategy for doing so (deferred consumption, market pricing, 
export orientation, individual incentives).9
Larry Wade and Alexander Groth, for example, have claimed that although 
most high-growth regimes lacked genuine multiparty competition, they had 
restraints in the sense of being secular, nontotalitarian, and nonmessianic.10 
The governments of these countries also supported the private business sector 
both directly and indirectly through the provision of infrastructure. In addition 
to elite cohesion and low levels of factionalism, these governments experienced 
continuity of political leadership and an active mix of evolving policies aimed 
at “shaping and channeling the economic, cultural and social order.”11
By contrast, Adrian Leftwich has argued that rapid growth can take place 
in either authoritarian or democratic states.12 In his analysis, high economic 
growth rates in Singapore, Malaysia, and Botswana in fact were products of 
democracy, as these states held regular multiparty elections, even if they were 
not fully competitive and despite the fact that a single party held on to power for 
several decades in each of these countries. Similarly, Chalmers Johnson found 
that Japan was able to generate rapid economic growth under a single-party 
democratic regime, although he attributed much of the country’s economic 
9 Larry L. Wade and Alexander J. Groth, “Politics, Policies, and Rapid Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries,” Policy Studies Journal 7, no. 4 (1979): 783. 
10 Ibid., 784.
11 Ibid.
12 Leftwich, Democracy and Development.
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success to the quality of its bureaucracy and the technocratic and pragmatic 
approach it took to developing successful policies for promoting high value-
added manufactured exports and national competitiveness more generally.13
As these studies illustrate, there is some ambiguity over what features 
constitute a democratic or nondemocratic regime. Recognizing these 
complexities, scholars also have examined the issue of whether the type of 
democracy (or nondemocracy) matters for economic growth. One major finding 
is that democracies with parliaments have achieved better growth performance 
than those with presidents.14 Among nondemocracies, authoritarian regimes 
with binding legislatures have faster growth than those with nonbinding 
legislatures,15 and overall there is more variation in economic growth rates 
across nondemocracies than among democracies.16
Perhaps because of the failure to find a strong and robust empirical link 
between regime-type and economic growth performance, much of the literature 
over the past two decades has focused on institutions, policies, and factor 
movements (rather than regime-type) to explain rapid growth performance. 
Case studies have found that exports of natural resources (minerals, metals, 
and fuels), human capital accumulation, and total factor productivity growth 
can drive rapid economic growth in developing countries.17 In East Asia, an 
area relatively low in natural resource exports, the World Bank attributed 
rapid growth to public policies and government institutions that enhanced 
education, savings, and efficient investments,18 although Paul Krugman 
argued that increases in production inputs (working hours, number of laborers, 
capital investment) played a greater role than productivity increases.19 Others 
have argued that rapid East Asian growth benefited from a high degree 
of government-business cooperation, suppression of labor, and a unified 
legitimating ideology.20 These features may have helped to reduce the problem 
13 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982).
14 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2003).
15 Joseph Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic 
Growth and Investment,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (2008): 322-343.
16 Erich Weede, “Political Regime Type and Variation in Economic Growth Rates,” Constitutional 
Political Economy 7, no. 3 (1996): 167-176.
17 Carlos Alejandro Ponzio, “Globalisation and Economic Growth in the Third World: Some 
Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 37 (2005): 
437-467, and Yan Wang and Yudong Yao, “Sources of China’s Economic Growth 1952-1999: 
Incorporating Human Capital Accumulation,” China Economic Review 14 (2003): 32-52.
18 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993).
19 Paul Krugman, “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 62-78.
20 Xiaoming Huang, The Rise and Fall of the East Asian Growth System, 1951-2000: Institutional 
Competitiveness and Rapid Economic Growth (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).
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of capital flight so common in developing countries. In much of East Asia, 
leadership continuity and the presence of at least some constraints on political 
executives also may have played a crucial role in signaling “the government’s 
ability to credibly commit not to interfere with private property rights [which] 
is instrumental in obtaining the long-term capital investments required for 
countries to experience rapid economic growth.”21
Theorizing Sustained Rapid Economic Growth
Although the literature is divided on how political regime-types impact 
economic growth, this essay argues that competitive multiparty democracies 
may unfortunately have a disadvantage in sustaining rapid, accumulation-driven 
growth due to leadership discontinuity and greater difficulty in maintaining a 
politically insulated technocracy. Moreover, single-party states are likely to 
have an advantage in mobilizing labor and capital for rapid economic growth, 
even if they do not provide an advantage in increasing total factor productivity. 
In this essay, I apply the definition of competitive multiparty democracy 
(CMD), established by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues, as one in which 
there are periodic elections and alternation between political parties in power.22 
The CMD can either have two major political parties or more than two parties, 
but the important point is that a single party does not stay in power for a long 
continuous period.
There are two hypotheses I seek to test in this essay. The first hypothesis 
[H1] is that on average non-CMD regimes will be more successful in generating 
sustained rapid economic growth than CMDs. The second hypothesis [H2] is 
that among non-CMD regimes, single-party states are more likely to experience 
rapid growth than military regimes or monarchies. Here, I follow the typology 
developed by Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell in dividing non-CMD regimes 
into the primary categories of (a) monarchies, (b) military regimes, and (c) 
single-party states.23 Following their work and the insights of Barbara Geddes, 
I expect military regimes to be the least conducive to sustained rapid growth 
because of their fragility and low life expectancy compared to single-party 
states.24 Over the last several decades, single-party regimes and monarchies 
21 Witold J. Henisz, “The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth,” Economics and 
Politics 12, no. 1 (2000): 2.
22 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.
23 Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 
18, no. 1 (2007): 143-156. Hadenius and Teorell note there are also a small number of other 
nondemocratic regimes, including occupied countries, countries in civil war, “no-party states,” 
and theocracies.
24 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual 
Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 115-144, and Hadenius and Teorell, “Pathways from 
Authoritarianism.”
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have experienced much greater leadership continuity than military regimes.25 
Among monarchies and single-party regimes, I expect the latter to be more 
capable of generating rapid growth because the party’s members generally 
represent a larger and more diverse set of constituents than a royal family. Since 
a royal family may enjoy a certain degree of inherent legitimacy regardless of 
economic growth performance, the single-party regime may have both greater 
demand and capacity to sustain broad-based long-term growth.
In my analysis, two major forces propel sustained rapid economic 
growth. The first force is the expansion of total factor input (labor, financial 
investment, infrastructure, and land). The second is an increase in total factor 
productivity (labor, human capital, management, and innovation). I argue that 
in low- and middle-income countries, ceteris paribus, a country with a single-
party regime will have an advantage in mobilizing total production inputs. 
This idea goes back to the classic economic development logic articulated by 
Walt Rostow, who argued that a strong centralized state was necessary for the 
sustained “take-off” stage in which rapid economic growth would transform 
a society from traditional to modern.26 During this stage, science, technology, 
and modern production methods would diffuse throughout the entire economy 
and society, making growth an almost automatic process. Rostow’s stage 
conception of development also draws at least implicitly on the classic work 
of Friedrich List. In List’s theory of national development, “unity of labor” 
takes precedence over “division of labor” as a force for diffusing productive 
inputs and processes.27 A single-party state is likely to have an advantage in 
this process because its concentration of authority provides more capacity to 
shape the economy and align incentives toward long-term development goals. 
This capacity manifests itself in three dimensions: (a) mobilizing labor inputs, 
(b) mobilizing capital inputs, and (c) leadership and policy continuity.
Labor Inputs
Single-party regimes presumably have more capacity to force workers to work 
longer hours and increase labor participation rates compared to competitive 
multiparty democracies. Whereas workers in a multiparty democracy may 
pressure different political parties, demanding a five-day workweek, an 
eight-hour working day, paid vacations, sick leave, and other improvements 
to working conditions, the single-party state can require six-day or seven-
day workweeks. It can also set conditions so that ten-hour, twelve-hour, or 
25 Hadenius and Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” and Jan Teorell, Determinants of 
Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).
26 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
27 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1885).
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longer working days become common and in which employers do not have 
to compensate employees for illnesses or injuries. Under these conditions, the 
intensity of labor input is likely to be considerably higher than in a multiparty 
democracy under which there will be more space for labor unions to organize 
and campaign.
Unlike in multiparty democracies, single-party regimes experience 
less pressure to prioritize human rights and they can ban the formation of 
independent labor unions. Competitive multiparty democracies, on the other 
hand, generally guarantee at least some basic level of labor and human rights 
protection. This places restrictions on the state’s ability to coerce and control the 
population. Single-party regimes also may have an additional advantage in the 
difficult task of enforcing compulsory education and punishing truancy. Under 
a multiparty democracy, certain groups may resist compulsory schooling and 
the state may not enforce punishment of truancy. Single-party states, however, 
may take compulsory schooling more seriously as a means to condition the 
population to accept the one-party regime as well as to develop human capital 
for national productivity. If one-party states can school their entire population, 
they can also conscript them for national security purposes or labor-intensive 
infrastructure projects. In some cases, they may also use compulsory education 
as a tool to encourage and increase the participation of the female labor force.
In summary, single-party regimes may have more tools available to 
control their populations by determining the education curriculum, working 
conditions, and movement within (or out of) the country. Competitive multiparty 
democratic regimes do not have as much capacity to control their populations 
because they must allow a certain degree of autonomy and independence in 
media, education curriculum, and movement. If the media is open and pluralist 
and people are more aware of preferred alternatives elsewhere, they may be 
less convinced about the merits of their own government and national culture. 
They may also emigrate or campaign to bring changes to their government, 
depending on the degree of political space that is open for resistance.
Capital Inputs
Single-party regimes may also have an advantage when it comes to accumulating 
and directing financial capital into economic projects, such as connectivity 
infrastructure and export-oriented production. The concentration of political 
authority into few hands can sometimes enhance the task of attracting foreign 
investment capital and lend credibility to promising a hard-working labor force. 
The single-party regime also can devote all of its energies to economic growth 
as a single goal rather than have to balance between competing short-term 
demands and objectives in order to win elections. Additionally, it presumably 
is less concerned about the distribution of the fruits of growth, so it may 
object less to a disequalizing pattern of growth in which a small portion of the 
population disproportionately benefits at the expense of losses in the health, 
environment, and leisure time of the labor force.
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In the absence of genuine multiparty competition, states also can move 
faster in making decisions and in bringing about structural changes due to the 
concentration and centralization of power at the top. In multiparty democracies, 
power tends to be more decentralized and deconcentrated, making the state 
slower to adapt, adjust, and transform. A single-party regime may have more 
tools to insulate a technocratic managerial corps from processes of political 
contestation that are inevitable in competitive multiparty democracies.28 Lastly, 
one-party states are likely to generate higher rates of savings among residents 
because they provide less than democracies in the way of welfare-state services 
to the population. In some cases, single-party states have mobilized compulsory 
savings, as in Singapore’s Common Provident Fund (CPF). State-owned or 
state-controlled postal banks likewise can direct investment and household 
savings into priority areas, such as infrastructure.29
Leadership and Policy Continuity
A third dimension that may advantage single-party regimes in achieving and 
sustaining rapid economic growth is leadership continuity. A long tenure in 
power not only may increase the experience of political leaders but also create 
a degree of political stability and predictability for the population and foreign 
investors. Having more time on its hands due to the absence of having to prepare 
for competitive elections, a one-party state with leadership continuity may place 
a higher priority on improving public administration to reduce clientelism and 
corruption, an important prerequisite for rapid economic growth.30 Leadership 
continuity and technocratic insulation also may make it easier for the regime to 
apply selective and strategic trade and economic policies as opposed to blanket 
opening or protection.31
In summary, this section argues that single-party states are likely to have 
an advantage over competitive multiparty democracies in sustaining rapid 
economic growth. This, however, does not make sustained rapid growth in 
low- or middle-income democracies impossible. It only means that it is more 
difficult to achieve in multiparty democracies, and may require specific 
ideological or institutional arrangements to sustain policy continuity, insulate 
technocratic management, maintain a long-term perspective, and so forth. In 
this regard, parliamentary regimes appear to have advantages over presidential 
ones because they may be more conducive to long-term consensus-building 
and the reduction of friction between the executive and legislative branches of 
28 Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery.
29 Woo, Race to the Swift, and Eduardo Borensztein and Jonathan D. Ostry, “Accounting for 
China’s Growth Performance,” American Economic Review 86, no. 2 (1996): 224-228.
30 Peter Evans and James Rauch, “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the 
Effects of ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth,” American Sociological Review 
64, no. 5 (1999): 748-765.
31 List, The National System of Political Economy.
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government. Presidential regimes may be additionally handicapped because 
leaders are usually restricted to only one or two terms in office.32
Historical Experience
Our analysis of which regimes have been more successful in generating rapid 
growth begins by examining all countries that have sustained high growth over 
a period of at least a decade between 1960 and 2009. Although researchers are 
often advised to select cases based on an explanatory variable,33 this initial 
method of selecting cases based on the dependent variable is an appropriate 
choice when the aim is to identify explanatory variables and eliminate certain 
possible explanations.34 As students of rapid economic growth know well, 
“there is much to learn from outliers.”35 Here, I apply John Stuart Mill’s 
“method of agreement” to assess which political regimes (explanatory variable) 
were present in combination with the outcome of rapid economic growth. In 
other words, if I were unable to find competitive multiparty democracies to 
coincide with actual cases of rapid economic growth, it would disprove or 
infirm the hypothesis that they are conducive to sustaining rapid growth.
I use three different measures of sustained rapid economic growth. First, 
I compare countries able to maintain a growth rate averaging over 7 percent 
annually for two or more consecutive decades. Second, I examine countries 
that have been able to double per capita incomes within the space of a decade. 
Third, I include countries that have sustained an average annual economic 
growth rate above 7 percent for a single decade. I follow the definition of 
“rapid growth” established by the Commission on Growth and Development, 
which set the minimum threshold of 7 percent growth because “at that pace 
of expansion, an economy almost doubles in size every decade.”36 According 
to the commission, this rate of growth can allow most developing countries 
to catch up to industrialized states within two or three generations because 
“it is easier to learn something than it is to invent it. That is why advanced 
economies do not grow (and cannot grow) at rates of 7 percent or more, and 
why lagging economies can catch up.”37
This study covers five decades and relies on income and population 
32 Mark P. Jones, “A Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas,” Electoral Studies 14, no. 1 
(1995): 5-21.
33 Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference 
in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
34 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial 
Inquiry,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, no. 2 (1980): 174-197.
35 Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth 
and Inclusive Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), 19.
36 Ibid., 1.
37 Ibid., 18.
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data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database, 
which unfortunately excludes the high-growth economy of Taiwan.38 With the 
exception of the territory of Hong Kong, I included only countries that were 
independent and sovereign over each full decade examined. The economic 
growth rates reported are “real,” meaning they control for inflation of the local 
currency over time. Table 1 identifies the countries that sustained an average 
annual economic growth rate of 7 percent or higher over the course of two or 
more decades. As table 1 reveals, sustaining rapid growth for a long time is 
not easy and only a small number of countries have met this criterion over the 
last fifty years. In confirmation of my theoretical expectations, there were no 
competitive multiparty democratic regimes able to sustain rapid growth over 
two consecutive decades compared to eleven non-CMD regimes. Among the 
multidecade top performers in this dataset (which excludes Taiwan), eight were 
Asian economies (Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Singapore, South 
Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam) and three were African countries (Botswana, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Ivory Coast). Noticeably, no multidecade, sustained, 
high-growth economies during this time were located in Europe, the Americas, 
or the Caribbean. Among the eleven long-term rapid growth economies, four 
maintained rapid growth for three consecutive decades (Botswana, Hong Kong, 
38 World Bank, “World Development Indicators On-Line Database” (2011) http://www.worldbank.
org (accessed March 31, 2011).
Table 1.  Countries Sustaining Rapid Growth over Two or More Decades 
(1960-2009)
Country High Growth Phase Open Elections Leadership Continuity
Botswana 1960s-70s-80s Not competitive Botswana Democratic Party
Cambodia 1990s-2000s Not competitive Cambodian People’s Party
China 1970s-80s-90s-2000s No Chinese Communist Party
Equ. Guinea 1990s-2000s No Teodoro Obiang Ngeuma
Hong Kong 1960s-70s-80s No UK Colony
Ivory Coast 1960s-70s No Felix Houphouet-Bogny
Kuwait 1990s-2000s No Emirs of Kuwait
Singapore 1960s-70s-80s-90s Not competitive People’s Action Party
South Korea 1960s-70s-80s Not competitive Military Dictators
Thailand 1960s-70s-80s Sometimes Military Dictators (mostly)
Vietnam 1990s-2000s No Vietnamese Communist Party
Data Source: Income and population data are taken from the World Bank.
Note: Dataset excludes Taiwan.
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South Korea, Thailand) and two sustained rapid growth over four decades 
(China and Singapore). Although not part of the WDI dataset, Taiwan also 
sustained high growth over at least three decades prior to democratizing. In 
summary, the data in table 1 support my first hypothesis that political regimes 
with leadership continuity have an advantage at generating rapid economic 
growth over competitive multiparty democracies in which different political 
parties alternate in power.
In table 2, I adopt a different approach to measuring rapid economic 
growth. The table displays only countries that have been able to double per 
capita income (PCI) over the span of a decade. The fastest growth decade on 
record over the last half-century was Oman’s in the 1960s, when it quadrupled 
PCI in just ten years. Equatorial Guinea in the 1990s and 2000s and Azerbaijan 
in the 2000s more than tripled PCI, while Turkmenistan in the 2000s and 
Botswana in the 1970s came close to tripling PCI. Aside from the small country 
of Equatorial Guinea, China distinguished itself as the only other country to 
double PCI in more than one decade. China is unique in having doubled PCI 
for three decades (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) in a row. What also stands out 
in this comparison is that thirteen of the fifteen cases of PCI doubling were 
non-CMD regimes. The two multiparty democratic exceptions were countries 
with very small populations: Malta in the 1970s (350,000 people), which 
Table 2. Countries that Doubled Per Capita Income (PCI) in a Decade
Rank Country Decade PCI Growth Regime-Type
1 Oman 1960s 300% Monarchy
2 Equatorial Guinea 1990s 294% One-party
3 Azerbaijan 2000s 252% One-party
4 Equatorial Guinea 2000s 238% One-party
5 Turkmenistan 2000s 183% One-party
6 Botswana 1970s 164% One-party
7 China 2000s 132% One-party
8 Malta 1970s 128% Multiparty Democracy
9 China 1990s 125% One-party
10 Japan 1960s 123% One-party
11 Armenia 2000s 109% Multiparty Democracy
12 Saudi Arabia 1970s 108% Monarchy
13 China 1980s 106% One-party
14 Angola 2000s 105% One-party
15 Belarus 2000s 101% One-party
Data Source: Income and population data are taken from the World Bank.
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experienced continuous leadership under Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff 
from 1971 to 1983, and Armenia in the 2000s, with a population of only three 
million people.
Thus far, we have found substantial support for our first hypothesis that 
non-CMD regimes with leadership continuity have an advantage in sustaining 
rapid economic growth. There were no competitive multiparty democracies 
that sustained rapid growth over two or more decades and only two were 
able to double PCI in a single decade. Our next approach will be to soften the 
criteria for “rapid” economic growth by looking at countries that maintained a 
7 percent or higher average annual GDP growth rate over the course of a single 
decade.
Table 3 displays the rapid growth countries by decade over the period from 
1960 to 2009. In line with our theoretical expectations, during the 1960s, the 
majority of countries to sustain rapid economic growth were not multiparty 
democracies. Only two (Israel and Japan) of fifteen high-growth regimes could 
be labeled CMDs, although Japan was actually ruled by a single party for four 
continuous decades. In the 1970s, the number of high-growth countries almost 
doubled to twenty-eight. A strong majority (twenty-one) of these countries 
were clearly nondemocratic, while an additional three (Botswana, Malaysia, 
and Singapore) were single-party democracies and two (Dominican Republic 
and Thailand) experienced a regime transition during the decade. The only 
high-growth states to sustain competitive multiparty democracies in the 1970s 
were the small Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta.
During the 1980s, we see the same connection between non-CMD regimes 
and rapid growth. Among nine rapidly growing economies, Thailand was the 
only one to experience competitive multiparty elections, yet this was only 
for a brief interim between periods of military rule. Although Botswana and 
Singapore held elections, a single dominant party has ruled both countries 
continuously since the time of their decolonization in the 1960s. The other 
rapidly growing economies lacked competitive multiparty democracy.39
In the 1990s, once again, we see a pattern resembling previous decades. 
Nine of eleven rapid-growth states had non-CMD regimes in power for at least 
twenty years. Among these nine states, in every case except the Maldives, the 
ruling party or leader in power during the 1990s was still in control in 2010. 
Lebanon was one of only two putatively multiparty regimes with rapid growth. 
Although it had a democratic structure of government, a fair amount of its 
economic growth was due to reconstruction and recovery from its fifteen-
year civil war (1975-1990). None of the other top ten high-growth states had 
39 As mentioned earlier, Taiwan was also a military dictatorship during the decade of the 1980s, 
and should be included among the top ten most rapidly growing economies of the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. It is absent from these charts only because the WDI dataset does not include 
Taiwan.
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Table 3. Countries with Sustained Rapid Economic Growth by Decade (1960-2009)
1960-69 Country Average Annual Growth PCI Growth Polity II Score Regime
1 Oman 22.8% 300% -10 Monarchy
2 Iran 11.6% N/A -10 Dictatorship
3 Japan 10.4% 123% 10 Democracy
4 Hong Kong 10.3% 85% N/A Colony
5 Singapore 9.5% 80% 7, -2 One-party
6 Israel 9.1% 60% 10, 9 Democracy
7 Togo 9.1% 66% -6, -7 Dictatorship
8 Ivory Coast 8.7% 44% -9 Dictatorship
9 South Korea 8.3% 69% -7, 3 Mixed
10 Mauritania 8.1% N/A -4, -7 Dictatorship
11 Panama 8.1% 55% 4, -7 Mixed
12 Thailand 7.8% 50% -7, -2 Dictatorship
13 Spain 7.8% 78% -7 Dictatorship
14 Greece 7.6% 83% 4, -7 Mixed
15 Nicaragua 7.4% 45% -8 Dictatorship
1970-79 Country Average Annual Growth PCI Growth Polity II Score Regime
1 Botswana 15.7% 164% 7 One-party
2 Jordan 15.2% N/A -9, -10 Monarchy
3 Saudi Arabia 14.2% 108% -10 Monarchy
4 Cyprus 13.6% N/A 8, 0, 7 Democracy
5 UAE 12.6% N/A -8 Monarchy
6 Brunei 12.2% N/A N/A Monarchy
7 Malta 11.1% 128% N/A Democracy
8 Gabon 9.9% 63% -9 Dictatorship
9 Hong Kong 9.6% 82% N/A Colony
10 Singapore 9.2% 84% -2 One-party
11 Seychelles 9.2% 81% N/A Dictatorship
12 Syria 8.8% 70% -9 Dictatorship
13 Lesotho 8.5% 72% -9, -7 Dictatorship
14 Brazil 8.5% 67% -9, -4 Dictatorship
15 South Korea 8.3% 74% 3, -8 Dictatorship
16 Dom. Rep. 8.2% 46% -3, 6 Mixed
17 Paraguay 7.9% 63% -8 Dictatorship
18 Indonesia 7.8% 60% -7 Dictatorship
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19 Malaysia 7.7% 60% 4 One-party
20 Ivory Coast 7.6% 22% -9 Dictatorship
21 Thailand 7.5% 49% -7, 2 Mixed
22 China 7.4% 43% -8, -7 One-party
23 Ecuador 7.4% 45% 0, -5 Dictatorship
24 Cameroon 7.3% 49% -7, -8 Dictatorship
25 Tunisia 7.2% 56% -9 Dictatorship
26 Kenya 7.2% 47% -7 Dictatorship
27 Algeria 7.2% 34% -9 Dictatorship
28 Nigeria 7.0% 19% -7, 7 Dictatorship
1980-89 Country Average Annual Growth PCI Growth Polity II Score Regime
1 Botswana 11.5% 97% 7, 8 One-party
2 Oman 9.8% 58% -10 Monarchy
3 China 9.8% 106% -7 One-party
4 Bhutan 9.6% N/A -10 Monarchy
5 Swaziland 8.6% 45% -10 Monarchy
6 South Korea 7.7% 90% -8, 6 Dictatorship
7 Singapore 7.5% 54% -2 One-party
8 Hong Kong 7.4% 64% N/A Colony
9 Thailand 7.3% 62% 2, 3 Mixed
1990-99 Country Average Annual Growth PCI Growth Polity II Score Regime
1 Equ. Guinea 20.2% 294% -7, -5 Dictatorship
2 China 10.0% 125% -7 One-party
3 Lebanon 9.7% 51% N/A Democracy
4 Maldives 9.1% N/A N/A Dictatorship
5 Eritrea 8.1% N/A -6 One-party
6 Singapore 7.6% 45% -2 One-party
7 Kuwait 7.5% N/A -7 Monarchy
8 Vietnam 7.4% 66% -7 One-party
9 Cambodia 7.2% N/A 1, -7, 2 One-party
10 Malaysia 7.2% 45% 4, 3 One-party
11 Ireland 7.1% 69% 10 Democracy
2000-09 Country Average Annual Growth PCI Growth Polity II Score Regime
1 Azerbaijan 18.2% 252% -7 Dictatorship
2 Qatar 15.9% 34% -10 Monarchy
Table 3. Countries with Sustained Rapid Economic Growth by Decade (1960-2009)
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3 Myanmar 13.4% N/A -7, -8 Dictatorship
4 Equ. Guinea 12.9% 238% -5 Dictatorship
5 Turkmenistan 12.7% 183% -9 Dictatorship
6 Angola 12.6% 105% -3, -2 Dictatorship
7 China 11.0% 132% -7 One-party
8 Kuwait 9.5% N/A -7 Monarchy
9 Ethiopia 9.3% 61% 1 One-party
10 Chad 9.1% 61% -2 Dictatorship
11 Bhutan 8.9% 69% -10, -6 Monarchy
12 Belarus 8.5% 101% -7 Dictatorship
13 Cambodia 8.3% 72% 2 One-party
14 India 8.3% 67% 9 Democracy
15 Armenia 8.2% 109% 5 Democracy
16 Uganda 7.8% 45% -4, -1 Dictatorship
17 Tajikistan 7.7% 79% -1, -3 Dictatorship
18 Uzbekistan 7.5% 60% -9 Dictatorship
19 Kazakhstan 7.5% 93% -4, -6 Dictatorship
20 Panama 7.5% 46% 9 Democracy
21 Cuba 7.4% N/A -7 One-party
22 Argentina 7.4% 28% 8 Democracy
23 Vietnam 7.4% 68% -7 One-party
24 Mozambique 7.3% 59% 6 One-party
25 Sudan 7.3% 51% -7, -4 Dictatorship
26 Mongolia 7.3% 57% 10 Democracy
27 Nigeria 7.2% 38% 4 One-party
28 Laos 7.1% 55% -7 One-party
29 UAE 7.0% 17% -8 Monarchy
30 Bahrain 7.0% N/A -9, -7 Monarchy
31 Malawi 7.0% 13% 6 Democracy
Data Sources:  Income and population data are taken from the World Bank. Polity-II 
scores are from Monty G. Marshall and Kurt Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009” (2011) 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed March 
30, 2011).  According to Polity-II, country scores between 6 and 10 
represent consolidated democracy; scores between -6 and -10 designate 
consolidated autocracies; and scores between -5 and +5 reflect in-
between cases, or “anocracies.”
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multiparty democracies. The only rapidly growing economy in the 1990s with 
a competitive multiparty democracy was Ireland (the “Celtic Tiger”), ranking 
eleventh. When compared to the 1970s, the 1980s were definitely a “lost 
decade” from the perspective of rapid economic growth, as were the 1990s. 
Over these twenty years, sometimes referred to as the “neo-liberal era,” only 
about one of every sixteen (6.6 percent) countries in the world was able to 
sustain rapid economic growth for at least one decade.
From 2000 to 2009, however, the number of countries with rapid economic 
growth exploded from eleven to thirty-one. Once again, in the 2000s, non-CMD 
regimes had the edge in sustaining rapid economic growth. All ten of the fastest 
growing economies over the decade from 2000 to 2009 (Angola, Azerbaijan, 
Chad, China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Myanmar, Qatar, and 
Turkmenistan) lacked multiparty democracy. Aside from the top ten, among 
the next twenty fastest growing economies, there was a preponderance of non-
CMD regimes making up twenty-five of the thirty-one (81 percent) rapidly 
growing countries. Although elections were held in certain states, many states 
witnessed continuous rule by a single party or leader (i.e., Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Mozambique, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and so on). In these countries, 
opposition parties and the media were severely constrained by the government. 
There were, however, six rapidly growing economies recognized as sustaining 
competitive multiparty democracy (Argentina, Armenia, India, Malawi, 
Mongolia, and Panama) during the 2000s. This represents a significant increase 
over previous decades and is most certainly a welcome new development.
To recap, from 1960 to 1999, with the partial exception of Japan, all of 
the countries to experience alternating political parties in power and sustained 
rapid economic growth (Cyprus, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, and Malta) for at 
least a decade were small states on the periphery of Europe. In the 2000s, 
however, for the first time in five decades, six post-colonial countries in 
the developing world sustained rapid economic growth under competitive 
multiparty democracies. In summary, the historical experience provides strong 
support for my first hypothesis that non-CMD regimes are more likely to 
sustain rapid economic growth than CMDs.
Regression Analysis
The next step in our analysis is to move from descriptive statistics to OLS 
multiple regression analysis to see whether regime-type statistically matters 
for rapid growth after controlling for a range of alternative explanations. To 
summarize the historical experience, we can view each country as fitting into 
one of four combinations, based on the presence or absence of rapid growth 
and competitive multiparty democracy. Using country-decades as our unit of 
analysis and working with data compiled by the World Bank, we examined 
data for 670 cases over the last five decades. As table 4 displays, the majority 
(88.5 percent) of these cases did not sustain rapid growth and this majority 
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was split almost evenly between CMD regimes (46.4 percent) and non-
CMD regimes (42.1 percent). Among the minority (11.5 percent) to sustain 
rapid growth over at least a decade, most (82 percent) were not competitive 
multiparty democracies. Among the non-CMD states, about one in five (18.3 
percent) experienced rapid growth, while only 4.4 percent of the CMD states 
sustained rapid growth. The difference is a ratio of about four to one.
Although there were few competitive multiparty democracies to sustain 
rapid growth over the last fifty years, we did observe a noticeable increase in 
their presence during the 2000s. To assess whether this change represents a 
positive breakthrough for CMD regimes, I utilized OLS regression analysis 
on the dichotomously defined outcome of achieving or failing to attain 
rapid economic growth as the dependent variable. The explanatory variable 
of primary interest is a dummy variable for CMD, taken from José Antonio 
Cheibub and his colleagues based on criteria developed with Adam Przeworski 
and others concerning the presence of competitive elections and alternation 
of parties in power.40 I also included multiple control variables to cover 
total factor inputs at the start of each decade. These variables measure each 
country’s land (in square kilometers), labor (population size), and initial level 
of economic development (per capita income), taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database. I also controlled for regional effects 
by using continental dummy variables.
Table 5 displays the results of the regression analysis. Models 1 through 
3 cover the periods 1960-1999, 2000-2009, and 1960-2009, respectively. In 
all three periods, the results are identical. The CMD regime is statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with rapid growth, even after controlling 
for other factors. The only other variables that were statistically significant were 
population size and a regional dummy for Asia, both of which were positively 
correlated with rapid growth. When we compare the whole population of high- 
and low-growth regimes and control for other relevant factors, we find that over 
the last decade, as in previous decades, competitive multiparty democracies 
are negatively correlated with rapid growth.
Table 4.  Comparing Four Regime Outcomes across 670 Country-Decades 
from 1960 to 2009
Regime Type High Growth Low Growth
Competitive Multiparty Democracy 14 (2.1%) 311 (46.4%)
Not Multiparty Democracy 63 (9.4%) 282 (42.1%)
40 Przeworski et al, Democracy and Development, and José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, 
and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited Database” (2009) 
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html (accessed May 10, 2011).
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To test my second hypothesis that among non-CMD regimes, single-party 
states are more conducive to rapid growth than military regimes or monarchies, I 
conducted a second set of regression analyses on 562 country-decades between 
1970 and 2009. I utilized the coding established by Hadenius and Teorell for 
monarchies, military regimes, and single-party states for the period between 
1972 and 2008.41 Following their lead, I also made a distinction between 
single-party states such as China and Vietnam, where “all parties but one is 
forbidden (formally or de facto) from taking part in elections,” and a “multiparty 
autocracy” or “limited multiparty regime,” as in Singapore, where there is a 
single dominant party but also “elections in which (at least some) candidates 
are able to participate who are independent of the ruling regime.” As Hadenius 
and Teorell note, the “multiparty autocracy” regime-type corresponds closely to 
Table 5. Regression Analysis I: Rapid Economic Growth 1960-2009
Model 1 - Rapid 
Growth 1960-2009
Model 2 - Rapid 
Growth 1960-1999
Model 3 - Rapid 
Growth 2000-2009
Regime Variables
Multiparty Democracy -0.117 (0.030)*** -0.096 (0.035)*** -0.201 (0.064)***
Control Variables
Per Capita Income -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Land Size -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Population Size  0.000 (0.000)**  0.000 (0.000)*  0.000 (0.000)**
Africa  0.025 (0.059)  0.016 (0.071)  0.051 (0.112)
Americas  0.024 (0.059)  0.019 (0.069)  0.063 (0.121)
Asia  0.194 (0.061)**  0.161 (0.072)**  0.263 (0.114)**
Caribbean  0.101 (0.071)  0.069 (0.082)  0.194 (0.140)
Europe  0.049 (0.059)  0.055 (0.069)  0.060 (0.114)
Intercept  0.099 (0.058)*  0.087 (0.069)  0.155 (0.109)
(n) 670 490 180
Residual Std. Error 0.30 0.29 0.33
Multiple R2 0.12 0.09 0.22
Note: Standard Errors are in Parentheses.
Significance Codes:  *** p=<0.01, ** p=<0.05, * p=<0.10.
41 Hadenius and Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” and Jan Teorell, Nicholas Charron, 
Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg, and Bo Rothstein, “The Quality of Government Dataset, 
version 6Apr11,” University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute (2011) http://
www.qog.pol.gu.se (accessed June 7, 2011).
44  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 7, No. 1
Andreas Schedler’s depiction of “electoral authoritarianism” and what Steven 
Levitsky and Lucan Way have labeled “competitive authoritarianism.”42
As shown in table 6, when we break down non-CMD states into monarchies, 
military regimes, single-party states, and multiparty autocracies, only the 
single-party state has a statistically significant and positive correlation with 
rapid growth (Model 4). Thus, we find support for our second hypothesis that 
single-party states are more likely to sustain rapid economic growth than other 
42 Hadenius and Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” 145; Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral 
Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006); 
and Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of 
Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51-65.
Table 6. Regression Analysis II: Rapid Economic Growth 1970-2009
Model 4 - Rapid 
Growth 1970-2009
Model 5 - Rapid 
Growth 1970-1999
Model 6 - Rapid 
Growth 2000-2009
Regime Variables
Multiparty Democracy -0.096 (0.040)** -0.088 (0.047)* -0.108 (0.075)
Monarchy  0.007 (0.065) -0.041 (0.074)  0.138 (0.123)
Military Regime  0.003 (0.051)  0.014 (0.055)  0.014 (0.128)
Single-Party State  0.155 (0.059)***  0.096 (0.063)  0.663 (0.163)***
Multiparty Autocracy  0.028 (0.039)  0.008 (0.046)  0.053 (0.072)
Control Variables
Per Capita Income -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Land Size  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Population Size  0.000 (0.000)***  0.000 (0.000)*  0.000 (0.000)
Africa  0.027 (0.064)  0.013 (0.075)  0.094 (0.116)
Americas  0.027 (0.064)  0.018 (0.074)  0.069 (0.121)
Asia  0.180 (0.066)***  0.132 (0.078)*  0.227 (0.118)*
Caribbean  0.075 (0.074)  0.035 (0.085)  0.148 (0.140)
Europe  0.027 (0.063)  0.028 (0.075)  0.058 (0.115)
Intercept  0.067 (0.066)  0.066 (0.077)  0.057 (0.120)
---
(n) 562 387 175
Residual Std. Error 0.29 0.27 0.32
Multiple R2 0.15 0.11 0.30
Note: Standard Errors are in Parentheses.
Significance Codes:  *** p=<0.01, ** p=<0.05, * p=<0.10.
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non-CMD regimes. Competitive multiparty democracies were also statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with rapid growth, while Asia is the only 
region positively correlated with rapid growth. In order to test whether there 
has been any change in the twenty-first century, I also split the dataset into 
cases before (Model 5) and after the year 2000 (Model 6). As it turns out, in 
Model 6, which includes only the past decade (2000-2009), we notice a subtle 
difference: the negative impact of CMD regimes on rapid growth is no longer 
statistically significant.
Conclusion
The findings of this essay appear somewhat pessimistic. In comparing long-
term rapid growth economies over the last fifty years, only eleven regimes 
maintained high rates of growth over two continuous decades or more and 
none of these regimes was a competitive multiparty democracy. Through a 
decade-by-decade analysis, we also found that over the last fifty years, a strong 
majority of rapidly growing economies had nondemocratic governments, while 
only a handful of multiparty democracies sustained rapid growth for at least a 
decade.
From the results of this study, it appears that leadership continuity may 
provide an advantage in fostering rapid economic growth over alternation 
between political parties in power. At the same time, while leadership 
continuity may have contributed to sustained rapid growth in successful cases, 
it was certainly not sufficient. In some countries, non-CMD regimes stayed in 
power for extended periods without sustaining rapid economic growth. Even if 
authoritarian states were four to five times more likely to generate rapid growth 
than CMDs over this period, we found that not all authoritarian countries had 
a growth advantage. Compared to monarchies and military regimes, the non-
CMD regimes that grew the fastest were more likely to be single-party states.
A more optimistic finding from this study, however, is the significant 
increase in the number of multiparty democracies to sustain rapid economic 
growth in the twenty-first century. These high-growth democracies have 
emerged in very different regions of the Global South, including Africa 
(Malawi), Central America (Panama), Central Asia (Armenia), East Asia 
(Mongolia), South America (Argentina), and South Asia (India). Although non-
CMD regimes may possess certain advantages in sustaining rapid growth, this 
study finds that it is definitely possible for multiparty democracies to sustain 
high growth rates under certain circumstances. The mere fact that high-growth 
democracies have recently increased in number may also reflect a degree of 
learning, reflection, and imitation of what has propelled rapid-growth economies 
in the past. As the Commission on Growth and Development has observed, 
while in the past it has been typical for governments in multiparty democracies 
to “look no further than the next election,” there is now an increasing push for 
rival political parties to “agree on a bipartisan growth strategy, which they each 
46  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 7, No. 1
promise to follow when it is their turn in power.”43 In conclusion, although it 
may be a bit premature to declare a rapid growth breakthrough for multiparty 
democracies in the twenty-first century, we may now be entering an era where 
multiparty democracies have greater success in sustaining rapid growth than 
in the past.
43 Commission on Growth and Development, “Growth Report,” 27-28.
